are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the Antithesis -or we need to find a Synthesis. At the end of this paper I will indicate my preferred solution.
Although the antinomy can be framed purely in terms of physical properties (e.g. mass), it also connects with the debate about special science causation in a number of interesting ways. First of all, and most obviously, the special sciences seem to deal in determinable properties too, so they should be concerned with any threat to their causal efficacy. Second, and more specifically, it has been argued by Stephen Yablo (1992) that we should think of the relationship between 'higher-level'
properties and basic physical properties in terms of the determinable-determinate relationship. The basic idea is that just as being red is a way of being coloured, so (for example) having one's brain in a certain specific condition is a way of being in pain.
Yablo argues that this way of thinking of the relationship between higher-level (or special) properties and physical properties offers a solution to the problem of mental causation, the so-called 'exclusion problem '. 2 This problem is often framed at an intuitive level in terms of the idea of causal competition: how can a mental (or any higher level) property have any effects in the physical world, if physical causes (properties) are always enough to bring about all physical effects? Don't the mental properties 'compete' for causal efficacy with the physical properties, entering a competition that they cannot possibly win?
Yablo answers this question by applying the determinate-determinable distinction. For just as the redness of the traffic light and its simply being coloured do not 'compete' with one another for causal efficacy, so the brain state and the pain do not compete. This is not because these properties are identical, any more than redness and being coloured are identical. It is rather that in any given case, being in a particular brain state just is a way of being in pain. With this account of the relationship between properties, plus an account of causation, Yablo attempts to solve the causal exclusion problem (cf. Macdonald and Macdonald 1986 for a earlier, related solution).
Ingenious though it is, Yablo's solution is threatened by the antinomy of determinable causation. For unless determinable properties can be causes, Yablo's solution will not work. It turns out that the ramifications of the antinomy touch any theory which treats any higher-level or special science properties as determinables.
The remainder of this paper divides into four parts. In the next part I lay out some background assumptions about properties, determinates and determinables, and causes and effects. In the third I present an argument for the Thesis: determinables can be causes. Then I present an argument for the Antithesis: only the most determinate properties can be causes. In the final section I suggest how the antinomy might be resolved.
Determinates, determinables and properties as causes
By 'property' I understand any general feature or quality or characteristic of things. I will talk about 'properties' in a general way, without prejudice as to whether they are universals, sets, tropes or some other kind of entity altogether. There will be other reasons to distinguish between different conceptions of properties, and we may find reasons for being committed to one or another controversial thesis about them. But for the time being I will simply try and state the obvious.
I assume here that if they exist at all, properties are distinct from the words we use to talk about them. The words we use to talk about properties are sometimes grouped together as 'predicates'. In fact, we also use words which are not, strictly speaking, predicates to talk about properties. 'Red', for example, seems to be the name of a property, whereas 'is red' or 'x is red' is a predicate. The natural thing to say is that 'red' is the name of the property which we predicate of something when we say that it is red. (Those with Fregean scruples may ignore this talk of names of properties; nothing turns on it here.) Some properties are related as determinate to determinable. 3 Colours are the standard textbook example. Shapes are another, sizes and weights are yet others. The basic idea is that the properties of being coloured, say, and being red are related in the same kind of way that the properties of being shaped and being triangular (or having a weight and weighing five kilos) are. Being red, being triangular and weighing five kilos are all determinates of the determinables colour, shape and weight. If an object has a colour, or a shape or a size, then it must have some specific, particular colour, shape or size: it cannot just be coloured, shaped or sized per se (or simpliciter as it is sometimes said). Similarly, if an object is red or square, it cannot just be red or square per se or simpliciter; it must be some specific shade of red or some specifically-sized square. So just as red is a determinate of the determinable colour, so scarlet is a determinate of the determinable red. The determinate-determinable relation is therefore a relative one: many properties are neither determinables or determinates in themselves, but rather they are determinates of one determinable, and determinables of other determinates. Thus red is a determinate of the determinable colour, and a determinable of the determinate scarlet.
However, it makes sense to suppose that there are properties which have no further determinates. To use a useful term of Eric Funkhouser's, these are 'super-3 Classic texts on this subject are: Johnston 1921 , Prior 1949 , Searle 1959 . Also important are Sanford 2006 , Yablo 1992 and Armstrong 1997 . An excellent recent discussion is Funkhouser 2006. determinates' (Funkhouser 2006 relations, like entailment, supervenience, or the genus-species relation. Take genusspecies for example. To say that human being is a species of the genus animal, for example, is to say that being a human being is being an animal plus something else (say, being rational). But being red is not being coloured plus something else. Being red is simply a way of being coloured. In addition, the determinate-determinable relation is not simply an entailment relation (although of course 'This book is red' does entail 'This book is coloured'). The way we are understanding the relation, the proposition 'P or Q' is not a determinable of 'P'; and 'P and Q' is not a determinate of 'P'. Yet these are examples of entailment.
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Second, it is traditionally held that determinates of the same determinable at the same level are incompatible with one another. If an object is completely red, then it cannot be completely yellow. If an object is triangular, then it cannot be square.
However, if an object is completely red it can be completely scarlet: determinables can be compatible with those properties which are their own determinates. But they obviously cannot be compatible with other determinates of those determinables with which they are already incompatible (e.g. yellow with scarlet).
Third, determinates of the same determinable can be different in varying ways.
Shades of colour, for example, can fail to coincide in at least one of three ways, realize that some philosophers will object to this idea. Some might say that events are causes, not properties (Davidson 1967 ). Others will say that facts (Mellor (1995) or states of affairs (Armstrong 1997) or tropes (Ehring 1997) the thesis that properties are causes is the thesis that instantiated properties are causes.
The second idea is that property instances are tropes, a different kind of entity altogether from properties considered as universals (Williams 1958; Campbell 1990 ).
If this is the right view of property instances, then the question arises as to the relationship between these tropes and the 'general' properties of which they are instances. What is the relationship, for example, between the particular whiteness of my shirt and whiteness as such? Is the relationship set-membership, as is maintained by a reductive account of universals in terms of tropes? Or should we admit universals as well as tropes, so we need some other kind of account of instantiation (Lowe 2006 )? These are difficult questions, but fortunately we do not need to answer them yet. For whatever view we have about the relationship between tropes, properties and universals, it will still be true that properties only have effects insofar as they are instantiated. The simple truth is that uninstantiated properties have no effects. And this is either because what has effects must exist in space and time, or because uninstantiated properties do not exist.
Properties in this sense are causes because whenever things have effects, they have those effects because of the properties they have. As Hume says in the Treatise:
'where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common among them' (Hume 1739-40: Book I, part III, section XV). The ice broke, inter alia, because it was fragile and because the skater weighed 100 kilos. These are properties of the ice and the skater. You might prefer to say that they are facts -the fact that the ice was fragile etc. -or states of affairs -the state of affairs of the skater weighing 100 kilos. I don't mind you saying this, so long as you allow me to say too that it was the skater's weight -a weight he shares with other people -that was a cause of the ice breaking.
For the purposes of this paper, I do not need to establish that other entities cannot be causes, only that properties can. Followers of Davidson will say that only events can be causes, and so will reject one of the starting assumptions of this paper.
But such philosophers cannot say either that the skater's weight or the ice's fragility is literally a cause of the ice's breaking; and to my mind this makes their position very unappealing. The other theories mentioned can accept, by contrast, that properties are causes; even if they would rather describe this in terms of facts, states of affairs or tropes. The important point is that they would also accept what I mean by saying that properties are causes.
Thesis: the efficacy of determinable properties
Suppose a matador's cape is a certain shade of red (say, scarlet). And suppose that it is the colour of the cape which causes a bull, on a specific occasion, to be enraged.
(This example is empirically false, of course, since bulls have monochromatic vision; but I keep it because it is simple, traditional and vivid.) Then we can say, along with the everyday platitude ('red rag to a bull'), that the bull became enraged because the cape was red.
Or was it because the cape was scarlet? On the face of it, we seem to encounter here an exclusion problem of the sort mentioned in section 1. If the scarlet is sufficient to enrage the bull, then how can the redness play any causal role?
Certainly, being red is entailed by being scarlet, but this does not imply its efficacy.
Being coloured is also entailed by being scarlet, but this does not imply that it is the mere fact that the cape is coloured which causes the bull to be enraged. The cape's redness looks like it is epiphenomenal, because it excluded by the sufficient cause, the scarlet. To say that both the redness and the scarlet are causes seems to be unnecessary double-counting, possibly leading to an unwelcome overdetermination.
Stephen Yablo (1992) proposed a way out of this problem, and then applied it to the mental/physical exclusion problem. Yablo's discussion is rich and complex, but at its heart are the following ideas. These 'would'-counterfactuals are interpreted in Stalnaker's way: '"if it had been that P, then it would have been that Q" is true iff Q is true in the P-world best resembling actuality' (Yablo 1992 : 274 note 56).
Yablo describes the essence of his solution as follows:
Suppose we stipulate that it contributed nothing to Socrates' demise that he guzzled the hemlock rather than simply drinking it. Then Xanthippe is mistaken when, disgusted at Socrates' sloppy habits, she complains that his guzzling the hemlock caused his death. Assuming that the drinking still would have occurred if the guzzling hadn't, [the counterfactual condition above] explains the error nicely. Even without the guzzling, the death would still have followed on the drinking. So while Socrates' death may have been contingent on his drinking the hemlock, it was not contingent on his guzzling it. (Yablo 1992: 188) Abstracting away from a lot of detail, we can see that if you have such a counterfactual conception of causation, then it is easy to derive the causal status of determinables. For on Yablo's preferred semantics for counterfactuals, and assuming 7 See Yablo 1992: 274. Yablo holds that the 'contingency' of effects on their causes is one necessary condition for causation; hence he differs from Lewis (1973) and many others in thinking that counterfactual dependence is a necessary condition of causation. For his way of dealing with problems of pre-emption (etc.) see Yablo 2004: 121ff. the truth of the (false) empirical claim about bulls, the following counterfactual, call it 'RED', is true:
(RED) If the cape had not been red, then the bull would not have been enraged
While the following, 'SCARLET', is false:
(SCARLET) If the cape had not been scarlet, then the bull would not have been enraged.
The idea is that the closest world in which the cape had not been scarlet is one in which it would have been a slightly different shade of red, and hence the bull would still have been enraged. Red is more proportional to the bull's anger than scarlet, even though scarlet is (in the circumstances, let us suppose) sufficient. 8 The fact that the cape is scarlet contains 'too much that is causally unimportant'. Therefore redness is a better candidate to count as the cause.
In broad outline, then, we can see how a determinable property like redness can be a cause and not compete with its determinates. The exclusion problem for determinables is solved. Or so it seems. For I now want to argue that given some other plausible metaphysical hypotheses about properties, predicates and causation, determinable properties cannot be causes after all.
4. Antithesis: only superdeterminate properties are efficacious 8 We can assume determinism here for the sake of argument, although this is not essential.
I begin by introducing what Lewis (1983) calls properties in the 'sparse' sense, or 'sparse properties'. The doctrine of sparse properties essentially involves a denial of the thesis that to every distinct (type of) property-word, there corresponds a distinct property. Not every distinct, non-synonymous word for a property introduces a new property. For the purposes of this discussion, predications can be distinguished by the meanings of the predicates expressed therein, or by the concepts expressed when predicating something of an object. So when I talk of 'predications' I refer to types of application of predicates to objects, unified by the meanings of the words involved.
It is uncontroversial that we should distinguish between property-words (general terms or predicates) and the properties they refer to -just as we should distinguish between names and what they refer to. But this does not itself imply that there is no one-one correspondence between property-words and properties. The following is a possible view: each object has one and only one name, each property has one and only one distinct property-word associated with it (a general term or a predicate), yet objects and properties are distinct from names and property-words. Of course, we know that what this view says about names is false. Objects have many names; some objects have no names; some names refer to no objects at all. But how do we know that this view is false of properties and property words?
One obvious answer is that there are property words (general terms or predicates) to which no property corresponds. If there is no such thing as phlogiston, then there is no such thing as the property of being phlogiston. Yet the word 'phlogiston' has a meaning, and predications of the property of being phlogiston have a meaning (most of them are just false, that's all). So in this case, at least, we know that there is a general term which corresponds to no property whatsoever.
To this it might be responded that properties are necessary existents; so even though it is not actually instantiated, the property of being phlogiston still exists, since the property itself exists in all worlds. This is sometimes said to be a difference between properties and objects: properties exist necessarily and (some) objects do not.
I myself find this an implausible view of properties; but fortunately we need not refute it in order to criticize the idea that properties and predicates correspond one-one. For even if properties are necessary existents, they need not correspond one-one with predicates.
To see this, consider the debate over whether there are 'disjunctive' properties.
It is perfectly meaningful to say, for example, that a wine is red or white, and hence that the predicate 'x is red or white' can be applied to it. But we are not obliged to say that a particular bottle of red wine has, in addition to the property of being red, the property of being red or white. This seems like over-counting properties. Surely it is better to say that the wine has one property, redness, and it is because of this that it is true to say that it is red or white. Anything which is red or white is either red or it is white. The disjunctive predication does not correspond to any disjunctive property.
And this could be true even if properties were necessary existents.
This does not show that there are no disjunctive properties; only that we do not need to postulate them in order to explain why a disjunctive predication is true. But nonetheless it gives us enough of an understanding of the idea that properties may fail to correspond one-one with predicates, and once equipped with this idea we can move on to consider what role properties might have in our theorising about causation, without them having to correspond one-one to predicates.
So one reason to reject disjunctive properties is that we do not need them in giving an account of what is true and why. There is an important and simple connection between the ideas of predication, property-hood, and truth. The properties of a thing are the ways it is, its general characteristics or qualities. When a predication of a property is true, it is true because of the way that thing is (and perhaps its relations to other things too). It is because the wine is a certain way -red -that it is true to predicate 'is red' of it. But it follows that it is also because the wine is that way that it is true to predicate 'is red or white' of it. The redness of the wine itself is enough to explain why it is true that it is red or white. We do not need the wine to have a further property, the property of being red or white.
9
The central idea here is just the simple one that although there are many colour predications of things, there is a sense in which a uniformly coloured object only has one colour. After all, this is part of what it means to call it uniformly coloured.
Although a uniformly coloured object may be said to have many colours in one sense -many distinct colour-descriptions are true of it -there is also a sense in which it only has one colour. In this sense, the colours of objects (if they exist at all) are sparse.
When a predication is true, it is the instantiation of a property which makes it true. This 'truth-maker' idea is, I think, one main motivation for believing in sparse properties. The same property (or instantiation of a property: see section 2 above) can make true many distinct types of predication. Now this truth-maker principle is difficult to spell out in detail. Armstrong has argued for an unrestricted version of the principle, while others (such as Lewis and D.H. Mellor) have denied that all truths have truth-makers, even though they do accept something like the idea. Here I do not endorse the thesis that all truths have truth-makers. Rather, I endorse a weaker thesis:
that if a predication has a truthmaker, its truthmaker is the instantiation of a sparse property.
The first role for sparse properties, then, is as truthmakers. The second is their role in causation. In introducing the terminology of sparse properties, Lewis distinguishes Armstrong-style universals from properties in his own special sense:
'almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd' (Lewis 1983: 13) . By 'property' here, Lewis simply means the extension of a predicate. He accordingly distinguishes between properties as such, which are abundant, and natural properties, which are sparse. Natural properties are 'the ones whose sharing makes for resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers. Most simply, we could call a property perfectly natural if its members are all and only those things that share some one universal' (Lewis 1983: 13) . Perfectly natural properties are sparse, and they are the ones responsible for the causal powers of things which have them. Ignoring the distinction Lewis makes between perfectly natural properties and universals, I will express the connection between sparseness and causation as follows: only sparse properties are the causally efficacious properties. If a property has effects, then it is a sparse property.
Why think only sparse properties have effects? Lewis says that they are the ones 'relevant to causal powers' but is this just a stipulation, or can some argument be given for it? I think an argument can be given. Consider first the case of disjunctive properties. The colour of a wine might have causal powers; it might cause Vladimir to buy it when faced with a choice in the wine shop, for example. Suppose Vladimir wants a red wine, and chooses this particular bottle because it was red. The redness of the wine is therefore a cause of his action. Given that the wine is red, it is also true that it is red or white. But how can its being red or white have any effects on Vladimir's action? He did not choose it because it was red or white, he chose it because it was red. In general, we can say that if the wine's colour has any effects at all, then it is the actual colour which matters, not the disjunction of that colour with a colour which it does not have. For how can a colour not possessed by something play
any role in what that thing causes?
Perhaps it will be obvious in this case that being red or white cannot have any effects, because whiteness is nowhere instantiated in this situation. But this point cannot be applied to all non-sparse properties, unless we have some independent reason for thinking that only sparse properties exist. 10 Some philosophers (Armstrong 1997 , Mellor 1993 ) do hold that view, and it does have some plausibility. However, I
will not commit myself to it here; instead I will argue that only sparse properties are causes, even if there are also (epiphenomenal) abundant properties.
To get to this conclusion, we need to make explicit some assumptions about causation: that it is relational, and that its relata are properties (or property instances).
When we make a true causal claim, we are describing a real relation between cause and effect. 11 So if a causal truth has a truthmaker, this truthmaker must be itself relational: it must relate cause and effect. The relata of the causal relation will then be the truthmakers for the relata of the causal truth. Causation, then, is a relation between truthmakers. And by our truthmaker principle proposed above, these truthmakers are sparse. Therefore the relata of the causal relation are sparse.
The view that causation takes place at the level of truth-makers should be welcome to any realist about causation who believes in truthmakers. Causation is a 10 Sartorio (forthcoming) has an interesting argument for disjunctive causes, based on a situation where there are two actual causes of an effect, neither of which is sufficient for the effect, but which are not joint (i.e. conjunctive) causes. Her argument is construed in terms of events, however, and so does not touch the point made here about properties. 11 Pace Mellor (1995) who denies that causation is a relation. Mellor has been effectively answered by Menzies (2003) .
mind-independent relation between instances of properties in the world. How causes and effects are then described is another matter. Causes can be picked out in a number of different ways, and only some of those ways will make explicit their identity as sparse properties. Nonetheless, what are picked out are the sparse properties. The thesis that causes are causes no matter how they are described will be familiar from Davidson's (1967) classic discussion of causation, but it applies equally to those views which deny that causation relates events.
Do all sparse properties have effects? Lewis seems to think so, since he describes them as those 'relevant to causal powers', suggesting that they all are.
Others would agree: those who agree with Shoemaker's (1979) view that properties are individuated by their causal powers, will hold that it is in the nature of any property that its possession by something which instantiated it was enough to dispose that thing to have certain effects. Of course, the claim would have to be restricted to empirical properties, rather than properties of numbers and other abstract objects. But if this Shoemakerian principle, applied to empirical properties, were correct, then we could say that all and only sparse properties are causes, or have causal powers.
However, it is the 'only' direction which is important to the present argument.
The next stage is to apply these ideas about sparseness and causation to determinables and determinates. Consider a particular determinable property I have, say, my height. If I have a height, I must have a specific height. I am tall, but that too is a (species-or culture-relative) determinable: to be tall is to have a specific height within a certain range of specific heights. (Of course, it is vague what this range is.
But that is not relevant here.) I am also over 150cm; over 160cm; and so on. This is a conclusion which will be accepted by many philosophers (Armstrong 1997; Mellor 1993 and 1998; Gillett and Rives 2005) many of whom think that there are in reality no determinable properties only determinable concepts. But the problem is that, as we saw in section 3, there are good reasons for believing that determinables can be causally efficacious. So something has to go.
Responses to the antimony
The antinomy is the conflict between the Thesis and the Antithesis: The argument for the Thesis is Yablo's . The essence of this argument is that our intuitive judgements about causes and effects often favour the counterfactuals which make the determinables causes. The argument for the Antithesis relies on two ideas:
truthmakers for predications of determinables are sparse; and if a property is causally efficacious, then it is sparse.
I will now consider a number of responses to this antinomy. Assuming our starting point that properties are causes, there are three kinds of option available. One could reject the Thesis, the Antithesis or find some way of reconciling them (a synthesis). I will examine these options in reverse order.
Certainly it would be nice to find a reconciliation or synthesis. One strategy for reconciliation would be to identify an ambiguity in the use of the word 'cause' in the Thesis and in the Antithesis, and remove the appearance of conflict by insisting that they are using the word in different ways. In the mental causation debate, for example, a distinction is sometimes made between causal efficacy and causal relevance of properties. 12 Some physicalists attempt to preserve a belief in mental causation by saying that even though physical properties are the causally efficacious properties, mental properties can nonetheless be causally relevant. Perhaps this distinction can be applied independently of physicalism. In relation to our example from section 3, we might say that redness is causally relevant to the bull's anger, The success of this response depends on the plausibility of the distinction between causal relevance and causal efficacy. Without a fully developed account of causal relevance and its distinction from efficacy, the response can simply look like an insistence that in one sense, redness is the cause, and in another sense, scarlet is the cause. But this is a way of describing our problem, not a solution to it! Kripke (1977) has commented on philosophers' tendency to postulate an ambiguity whenever their theory runs into counter-example. Without a detailed account of causal relevance, plus an independent account of efficacy, there is a danger that this reconciliation strategy is a case of this tendency.
In an influential paper, Ned Hall (2004) has given an account of two concepts of causation, which he calls 'dependence' and 'production'. Dependence is just the familiar relation of counterfactual dependence between distinct events (2004: 257).
Production is a relation between events which results in a causal process which is intrinsic, transitive and local (2004: 252-3; 265 provide a resolution of our Antinomy. To be sure, the argument for the Thesis relies on the appeal of the notion of causation as dependence. But the argument for the Antithesis does not rely on anything like the notion of causation as production, as Hall construes it. The sense in which the superdeterminate property is a cause does not entail that the relevant causal relation is transitive, for example. All that was appealed to in the argument was the idea of truthmaking, and the idea of truthmakers as causes.
These ideas, it seems to me, do not entail the conception of causation as production in
Hall's sense. Hall's disambiguation does not provide us with a Synthesis.
I am not saying that there cannot be a Synthesis; but in the absence of any more concrete proposal, I would rather look elsewhere for a solution to our antinomy.
For it turns out that one can give an account of the role of the determinable property in the explanation of effects without asserting any ambiguity in the ordinary word 'cause'.
Before dealing with this, I must dismiss the second possible response to the antinomy: to reject the claim that truth-makers must be super-determinate. On the face of it, this might seem intuitively plausible. Surely it is true that something is red simply because it is red; so what is wrong with stopping at the idea that the redness of things as such is one of the truth-makers of predications? This approach has some appeal, especially from the perspective of those (unlike Gillett and Rives 2005) who want to accept the existence of determinables as well as the existence of superdeterminates. But for this response to be a general solution to the antinomy, it has to work in every case. Take the case of height. There is a potential infinity of true height predications which are true of me (of the form 'I am at least n cm tall'). If the absolutely super-determinate height property is not the truth-maker for all these predications, then I see no non-arbitrary way of distinguishing among this infinity which ones are the truth-makers and which ones aren't. And to say that I have an actual infinity of height-properties and none of them is privileged is, in effect, to give up on the idea of sparse properties altogether.
To defend the idea that there is one truth-maker for the predication of an object's colour is in effect to defend the principle, mentioned above, that there is a sense in which a uniformly coloured object only has one colour. There may be another sense in which it has many colours -it is truly described as having many colours -but surely there is also a sense in which it only has one. As I said above, this
is part of what it means to call it uniformly coloured. Once one has accepted this, then it is easy to see that the uniform colour is a sparse property in Lewis's sense. Given the additional claim about the efficacy of properties, the Antithesis follows. To predicate a determinable property (like redness) of an object is, in effect, to specify that the object in question has a sparse property within some range. It is true that the bull charged because the cape was red; but that means that there is some property within a range (the range specified by the concept red) which the cape has.
Suppose that the cause of the bull's charge was the fact that it was a superdeterminate shade of scarlet; that doesn't mean that SCARLET is true. For SCARLET, too, specifies a range of properties: all the determinates of scarlet. The point is that it isn't necessary for the bull to charge that the provocative property only comes from within this latter range. For, ex hypothesi, bulls charge at red things. (Notice here that the range is along only one of the dimensions of the determinable -hue or chroma -and not along all of them. )
In committing ourselves to a claim like RED, then, we are committing ourselves to the idea that there is a property within the relevant range on whose instantiation the relevant effect is counterfactually dependent. So although I would resist Jackson and Pettit's (1988) Although my concern in this paper has not been with the mental/special sciences causation debate, the proposed resolution of the antinomy does have some consequences for that debate. One consequence is that the truth of counterfactuals of the general form 'if I hadn't had mental property M then I wouldn't have done X' cannot, without other assumptions, get you to any substantial conclusions about the causal efficacy of mental property M. Another consequence is that mental properties had better not be determinables with physical properties as their determinates, since this would make mental properties epiphenomenal on the conception of causation and sparse properties defended here. These consequences seem to me perfectly acceptable to someone who has this conception.
However, I do not pretend to have provided a knock-down argument for the There is, perhaps, a link to a more general issue in the philosophy of causation here. For some years now, many philosophers of causation have wrestled with the problems which pre-emption and redundant causation pose for counterfactual analysis. 16 Some of them have concluded that the analysis must be given up. Within the context of the metaphysics of sparse properties, and of a view on which properties are causes, it seems that the argument of this paper gives us another reason for doubting the counterfactual analysis: these counterfactuals, although they may be true, do not directly inform us about the causally efficacious properties of things. 16 See, inter alia, Menzies 1989 and 1996; Schaffer 2000 .
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